China and Africa

Myths and realities

Alexander Rustler
Research Fellow at the Economic Policy Research Institute
Cape Town, South Africa

ABSTRACT

China's newfound economic and political ascendency has attracted considerable attention across governmental, media, and academic channels. This paper seeks to challenge the prevailing narrative of Sino-African relations in the wake of China's rise, using a juxtaposition of Western and Chinese ideologies to evaluate three key debates related to China's involvement in Africa. Its emerging global presence along with rapidly expanding political and economic influence has captured the world's attention. The most prominent example of this preoccupation is how the West has responded to China's elevated status in the developing world. Beijing's pivot to Africa has generated a narrative supporting Western prejudices and concerns about shifting hegemony and power. The main casualty of this speculative fog has been the authentic and genuine representation of facts. Unsubstantiated rumours and political assumptions have been employed as a common currency among often-uninformed policymakers to the detriment of objectivity. Section one of the paper addresses the hypothesis that China's unprecedented economic rise has prompted Beijing to fuel its mushrooming economy through exploitation of Africa's resources. Section two examines the hypothesis that China predatorily targets countries where political instability and weak law enforcement enable easy access to natural resources. Section three challenges the notion that China's enhanced commercial presence in Africa is actually a strategic move to colonise territory. Each hypothesis is outlined according to the literature, empirically tested according to the facts, and contextually synthesised according to the data. Ultimately, the essay concludes that none of the three hypotheses withstand rigorous analysis and can therefore be collectively rejected.

INTRODUCTION

The rise of China has attracted considerable attention among politicians, journalists, and within academic circles. With a growing global presence and a rapidly expanding political and economic influence, China's emergence has captivated the world. These trends have raised a number of questions in the realm of diplomacy and international affairs (Kristof, 1993). Chief among these concerns is how the increasing salience of China can be reconciled with existing narratives of Western leadership and dominance (Jespersen, 1996). Depictions of China as Red Dragon or Yellow Peril have dominated the literature and henceforth propelled a binary image of a country that is customarily treated as unique (Cumings, 2009). The most prominent example of Western fixation upon the rise of China is how policymakers have approached the debate of China's elevated status in the developing world. In particular, Beijing's pivot to Africa has generated a variety of hubristic tropes, wherein Western policymakers seem to agree that the tale of China's involvement in Africa is a story of oppression—invoking images of predator and prey. This representation of Chinese dominance and African submission has permeated the discourse, obscuring the true nature of Sino-African affairs. To the detriment of objectivity, unsubstantiated claims of conquest and victimisation have become the common currency of uninformed policymakers. The main casualty of this speculative fog has been the authentic and genuine representation of facts. To analyse the nature of China's involvement in Africa, one must foremost dissect subjective interpretations, myths, and metaphors that dominate current media narratives. The purpose of this piece is to examine the validity of Sino-African discourses perpetuated by the West, through a more cautious lens that values empirical data over ill-founded rhetoric.

Outline

In light of the ongoing preoccupation with notions of contemporary Chinese "colonisation", this paper seeks to challenge the prevailing narrative on Sino-African relations in the wake of China's rise, through the juxtaposition of Western and Chinese viewpoints. In turn, the paper will evaluate three key debates on Chinese involvement in Africa, and divide this analysis into three main empirical parts. The first section addresses the hypothesis that China's stellar economic performance has prompted the Asian giant to fuel its mushrooming economy through exploitation of Africa's sub-terranean riches. Section two scrutinises the hypothesis that the People's Republic of China (PRC) explicitly targets countries where political instability and weak rule of law enables easy access to natural resources. Finally, the third part analyses the abstraction that China's enhanced presence in Africa represents a strategic move to politically subjugate people and land colonially. Each hypothesis will be outlined according to the literature, empirically tested according to the facts, and synthesised according to the data. Ultimately, this paper concludes that none of the three hypotheses withstand ample scrutiny, and therefore can be collectively rejected.

DEFINITIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Comparing Western and Chinese influences in Africa is a particularly taxing endeavour and requires the careful application of meaningful indicators and a thorough understanding of scholastic limitations. The variables that customarily serve as indicators of bilateral and multilateral relations, foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA), ought to be defined to ensure analytical rigour. Primarily, FDI will generally be understood as greenfield investment[1] and brownfield investment.[2] Generally, greenfield serves as a more appropriate

1. The development of new production facilities.

2. The acquisition of existing production facilities

parameter to measure FDI accounts for land grabbing and emphasises the actual acquisition of land.

In contrast, China's aid flows are difficult to trace and frequently form part of a comprehensive development package comprised of several deals. Various Chinese banking institutions—foremost among them China's Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and the China Development Bank (CDB)—advance loans and grants to projects as diverse as football stadiums, oil refineries, water sanitation or humanitarian emergency relief (Alden et al. 2008; Bräutigam, 2009; Ali and Jafrani, 2012). Although this spectrum is not novel to the ODA industry and resembles Western patterns of aid, few details about the distribution and conditionality of zero-interest and concessional loans have painted an elusive picture of Chinese ODA (Alden et al., 2008; Bräutigam, 2015). Although care has been taken to consult respective exchequers' databases—as well as relevant data from the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)—ODA comparisons between Western and Chinese donors must be analysed with a grain of salt. Furthermore, in accordance with Chen et al. (2015), good governance is herein understood as a combination of political stability and the rule of law.

HISTORY OF SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS

The majority of recent literature on China and Africa posits that contemporary Sino-African relations are the product of China's economic upswing in the final decades of the 20th century. Pressing topical issues, such as enhanced resource extraction and accusations of expansionism, have enabled scholars and journalists to disregard a long history of Chinese involvement in Africa, and myopically focus on the recent period of Sino-African involvement (Mawdsley, 2008). However, relations between Africa and the PRC date as far back as the 1955 Asian-Africa Conference. Interestingly, these ties are almost as old as the PRC, and have been marked by recurring and mutually beneficial partnerships (Naidu and Mbazima, 2008; Lee, 2014; Song, 2015).

"The Asian-African Conference was a seminal event in Sino-African history, for it was […] in 1955 that Communist China first made its tentative links with the African continent" (Taylor, 2006: 19-20). In 1955, decades before China turned into an economic juggernaut, both China and Africa set the stage for a longer term diplomatic relationship, grounded in mutual economic interest. Subsequent to establishing trade agreements with North African states, particularly Egypt and Morocco, Sino-African diplomacy expanded rapidly throughout the continent (Mawdsley, 2008). The PRC became more involved in Africa and supported a number of liberation movements. During Premier Zhou Enlai's African Tour (1963-64), the majority of independent African governments entered not only into diplomatic relations with the PRC, but also into ideological partnerships (Taylor, 2006; Mawdsley, 2008). Therefore, long before bilateral economic interests emerged, the developing nations were defined by a high level of ideological proximity due to a joint struggle for economic and political independence. In the face of Western reluctance to support development efforts in independent nations, China chose to finance the critical Tan-Zam Railway (despite its own economic underdevelopment). This project provided the nascent economies of Tanzania and Zambia with a cardinal artery to the Indian Ocean and thus a crucial stream of export-linked income. To this day, the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway remains China's biggest infrastructural investment in Africa. Beijing's support for newly independent nations has set an important precedent of third world solidarity for an entire developing continent (Song, 2015).

The 1970s and 1980s, in turn, saw African reciprocation of China's diplomatic and developmental support in the previous decades (Alden, 2007). Against the backdrop of the Cold War, the PRC was cast as an alternate political ally with an articulated stance against Western imperialism, during a period of forced regional alignment with Soviet and US political regimes. In 1971, amid its strategic dispute with Taiwan, the PRC won a seat in the United Nations with the vital support of African nations. In Taylor's words: "China was now ranging the entire world against the two Superpowers" and "encouraged links between the developing nations and the industrialised world" (2006: 41). Beijing's centrality as a counterbalance to the Superpowers thereby elevated both PRC's role within Africa and Africa's status as a non-aligned agent in a highly-charged political landscape (Large, 2008a).

In contrast, the recent period of Sino-African relations has witnessed a notable surge in establishing vigorous economic ties to underlie pre-existing ideological affiliations. Deng Xiaoping's market reforms (1978-1989) transformed China into an economic giant, inspiring Beijing to expand its financial involvement in many emerging economies throughout Africa. Bilateral trade flows act as an apt proxy to illustrate this increased economic investment. In the 1990s, two-way trade grew by 700 per cent, settling at 10 billion USD in 2000. This figure rose five-fold over subsequent years, reaching over 50 billion USD in 2006 (Alden, 2007; Raine, 2009). In 2014, Sino-African trade amounted to well above 220 billion USD, making China Africa's single largest trading partner (Patey and Chun, 2014).

In sum, China and Africa are connected by a modern history of ideological partnership and diplomatic reciprocity. Although most narratives emphasise the importance of the period starting in the 1970s (Alden et al., 2008), the preceding decades of shared ideological alignment laid the groundwork for subsequent periods of longstanding political and economic cooperation.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Hypothesis one: Beijing is only interested in Africa's natural resources in order to sustain the PRC's economic growth.

With the stated objective of absolute economic development under the auspices of Deng Xiaoping, the PRC has become a net importer of basic resources (Mawdsley, 2008). China's unprecedented economic growth has fuelled the notion that "[…] China is engaged in a short-term 'resource grab' which, […] takes little account of local needs and concerns" (Alden, 2007:5). Namely, this hypothesis contends that the PRC's funds are ineluctably invested in natural resource extraction, while the secondary[3] and tertiary[4] sectors remain largely ignored (Naidu and Davies, 2006; Alden, 2007; Alden et al., 2008; Economy and Levi, 2014). This is a false assumption due to the overarching body of empirical evidence which states that the bulk of China's investment projects are in the manufacturing and service industries.

3. The manufacturing sector

4. The services sector

To illustrate, Chen et al.'s 2015 study finds that the bulk of Chinese FDI deals are unrelated to the extraction of natural resources. Instead, the study suggests that approximately 20 per cent of the projects are invested in the primary sector[5], while another 20 are accounted for by secondary sector investments. The remaining portion, a thumping 60 per cent, flows into the tertiary sector, financing such activities as banking and insurance services, as well as wholesale retailing (Sy et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015). In contrast, United States investment in the primary sector stands at well above 60 per cent, while the remaining portion is distributed across manufacturing and services industries (So, 2016).

5. The natural resources sector

Figure 1. Chinese and U.S. FDI distribution across sectors (in per cent)



Source: Chen, W., Dollar, D., and Tang,H. (2015); So, A. Y. (2016).

The primary recipients of Chinese FDI are resource-rich countries, as is the case with major US and EU-led investment schemes (Sy, 2014; Dollar, 2016). China's focus on service industries remains nonetheless true, regardless of a country's resource wealth. An analytical distinction between investment in (1) oil-rich countries, (2) non-oil resource rich economies, and (3) resource-poor nations, substantiates this trend (Chen et al., 2015).

Although oil-rich Nigeria has become China's biggest recipient of FDI, almost two thirds of FDI projects in Nigeria go into the service industry, while scarcely a fifth of projects capitalise on the extraction of natural resources. Similarly, oil-exporting Egypt's share of FDI projects in the primary sector stands at well below 5 per cent. Similar trends of low investment in the primary sector are observed in Angola and Sudan (Chen et al., 2015). This pattern can be explained across all oil exporting countries by two phenomena. First, oil extraction increases demand for transportation, manufacturing and security, as part of the value chain (Dollar, 2016). Second, external to the value chain, the amalgamation of people around industrial hubs contributes to the growth of textile, consumer, and household goods sectors, which draw on Chinese firms and entrepreneurs (Zafar, 2007).

Figure 2. Chinese FDI distribution across sectors in top 4 oil-rich economies (in number of FDI projects)



Figure 3. Chinese FDI distribution across sectors in top 4 non-oil resource intensive economies (in number of projects)



Source: Chen, W., Dollar, D., and Tang,H. (2015).

Figure 4. Chinese FDI distribution across sectors in top 4 resource poor economies (in number of projects)



Source: Chen, W., Dollar, D., and Tang,H. (2015).

While the breakdown of sectoral investment varies across states, the existing trends suggest that China possesses an underlying interest in financing secondary and tertiary enterprises.

South Africa, Zambia, the DRC and Ghana supply the largest share of mineral resources to the PRC. South Africa's globally most-sought-after exports are gold, platinum and uranium (Taylor, 2006; Shelton, 2008). Zambia's and the DRC's copper endowments are invaluable to China's manufacturing industry (Lee, 2014) and Ghana provides China with an exceptional supply of timber (Loxley, 1990). South Africa's diversified economy has attracted investment from a wide array of high-technology businesses and financial institutions (Sy, 2014). Consequently, besides large investments in the manufacturing sector, only 10 per cent of Sino-South African FDI projects are implemented within the raw materials industry (Chen et al., 2015). Even in Zambia, where China maintains its largest share of primary sector ventures, the underlying trend clearly indicates commitment to financing secondary and tertiary investments (Lee, 2014). This sectoral commitment is further substantiated by the distribution of projects in the DRC and Ghana, where less than one in five projects ex-tracts natural resources (Dollar, 2016). Again, this trend can be attributed to spill over effects from re¬source extraction and private consumption (Zafar, 2007; Dollar, 2016).

This pattern of investment in secondary and tertiary sectors equally holds in resource-poor economies. For instance, despite Ethiopia's scarce endowment factors, Ethiopia is amongst China's top five FDI partners. Moreover, other East African economies, such as resource-poor Kenya, Uganda, and Mauritius rank amongst the PRC's pivotal FDI partners in the service and manufacturing sector. This can largely be credited to East Africa's need for infrastructural investment, comparatively diversified economies, and geographic proximity to China (Chen et al., 2015).

Overall, these trends warrant rejection of the hypothesis that Chinese engagement in Africa is exclusively substantiated by China's own economic incentives. While it is true that Chinese and Western investors alike channel the majority of their FDI projects to countries that possess natural resources, a sector-specific analysis reveals that Chinese investors, unlike Western investors, foremost emphasise investment in manufacturing and the services sector. This pattern holds for all three categories of aforementioned aid recipients: (1) oil rich nations, (2) non-oil resource rich states, and (3) resource-poor economies.

Hypothesis two: On the quest for accessible resources, China explicitly targets countries with poor governance

Beijing's foreign policy involvement in Africa—founded upon the principle of non-interference in the political affairs of sovereign states—has spurred widespread criticism (Carmody and Owusu, 2007; Kachiga, 2013; Taylor and Williams, 2014).

The policy allows the PRC to conduct business with whomever, regardless of a state's regime type, rule of law, or political landscape (Taylor, 2006). In contrast, the West has adopted a self-proclaimed ethic that purports to spread democracy across the developing world and officially refrains from conducting business in weak governance environments (Dollar, 2016). This ideological chasm, between China and the West, has furthered the narrative that Beijing deliberately invests in weak governance environments (Wood, 2004; Mailer, 2005; Large 2008b; French 2014). In a 2012 speech responding to China's growing involvement in Africa, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that "America will stand up for democracy and universal human rights even when it might be easier to look the other way and keep the resources flowing" (cited in French, 2014).

In the eyes of many Western leaders, China's support of poorly governed states in the form of FDI and ODA remains a contentious issue. Investments in countries like Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Egypt—all of which rank in the bottom third of

Figure 5. 2014 Chinese and Total FDI Stock by Governance Environment (in per cent)



the rule of law index (Agrast et al., 2016)—have fuelled disapproval from critics of China's non-interference policy (MOFCOM, 2014; Dollar, 2016). However, according to Chen et al.'s 2015 study on aggregate China's FDI and measures of national governance are positively correlated. While the study found clear correlation between Chinese FDI and the rule of law, it established a strong positive link between Chinese investment and political stability (Chen et al., 2015). This is due to the fact that the majority of Chinese FDI enters markets, such as South Africa, Ghana or Botswana, all of which score higher, in terms of rule of law and political stability, than most Western countries (MOFCOM, 2014; Agrast et al., 2016). In fact, by investing in secondary and tertiary sectors, Chinese financing has arguably hedged the risks of volatile commodity markets and consequently encouraged political stability in some countries (Lee, 2014). This trend emerges upon the division of African countries into three main analytical categories—top, middle, and bottom—according to their listings in the rule of law index. Figure 5 indicates that the Chinese presence in poor governance environments is in no way unique when considering the international landscape more broadly. Although China holds slightly more stock in the bottom third countries, the West (among other investors) is present as well. Despite this fact, China and the West both tend to invest in economies that are legally and politically predictable, producing a climate that is conducive to economic success (Dollar, 2016).

To illustrate this point, I analyse the outliers of Chen et al.'s 2015 study and discuss them in the context of the 2016 rule of law index rankings. Within the 2016 ratings, Egypt remains the lowest ranked African country. After the 2013 coup d'état, Egypt spiralled towards authoritarianism, which in turn led to a devastating decline in governance indicators; in particular political stability and the rule of law (Belhadj and Sun, 2016). Consequently, out of the 113 assessed countries, Egypt is ranked 110th (Agrast et al., 2016). In alignment with Western foreign policy agreements to promote democracy via punishment of autocratic regimes, policy experts expected decreasing FDI flows to Egypt (Belhadj and Sun, 2016). On the contrary, however, Western FDI has not only increased cumulatively but also on a year-to-year basis (MOFE, 2016). While Chinese FDI stagnated during this period (MOFCOM, 2014), in recent years Western investment—particularly from the United Kingdom and the U.S.—has risen substantially (MOFE, 2016).

To reiterate, ranking African FDI recipients according to the quality of their governance provides a clearer picture of FDI to Africa overall. Analysing global governance indices with national budget data included suggests that both the PRC's and Western companies invest the bulk of their funds in environments that are conducive to high returns on investment. Similarly, both Beijing and Western governments largely ignore governance indicators whenever it is economical and politically opportune to "keep the resources flowing" (Clinton, cited in French, 2014).

Hypothesis three: China's increased presence in Africa constitutes an attempt to colonise parts of Africa

China's economic interests within the African context have galvanised the hypothesis that China's increased presence is tantamount to a colonising mission (Alden, 2007; Jauch, 2008; Quinn, 2011; Sanusi, 2013; Economy and Levi, 2014; French, 2014). The argument relies on two main claims. On the macro level, it suggests that China ventures to overwhelm and charm African governments by ensuring a continuous flow of FDI and ODA (Bräutigam, 2009). Secondly, it portrays China as an in-

Figure 6. 2015 Distribution of FDI by contributors (in per cent). Data for India and South Africa from 2014.



Source: Sy, A., Copley, A. and Rakotondrazaka, F. M. (2014); AfDB/OECD/UNDP (2016)

herently state-led entity, with domineering political motivations that overpower other economic incentives (Ribeiro, 2010). This dual claim has lent itself to the dual visualisation of China of as an expansionist giant, and Africa its powerless victim. I argue that such claims are contentious and advance a number of scholastic misinterpretations.

It is true that in recent decades the world has witnessed a surge in Sino-African trade, ODA and FDI. A comparison of countries investing in Africa challenges the notion that China's presence in Africa forms part of an ulterior stratagem to colonise territory. In 2015 alone, Chinese FDI to Africa accounted for a meagre 3 per cent of the total greenfield flow to Africa (AfDB/OECD/UNDP 2016). Other investors, including bigger EU economics and former colonial powers, were thus responsible for 97 per cent of total greenfield flow to the continent. In

Figure 7. 2014 Distribution of FDI by donor (in USDbillion)



Source: AfDB/OECD/UNDP (2016).

2015, the EU's contribution of greenfield to Africa rose to 38 per cent, followed by the US which contributed just below 10 per cent (AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2016). Furthermore, according to multiple studies that include tallies of brownfield investment (Lee, 2014; Sy et al., 2014), the Atlantic powers account for well above 85 per cent of Africa's FDI stock. Interestingly, even contenders from the developing world have outspent Chinese investment. In 2014, Indian (5 per cent) and South African investment (9 per cent) managed to outpace Chinese investment, with South African FDI three times higher than Chinese FDI (Sy et al., 2014; AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2016; Dollar, 2016).

This trend seems to hold in the parallel case of ODA (Bräutigam, 2015). As in the case of foreign investment, China remains a marginal development partner to the African continent. In 2014, China's official aid to Africa stood at 3.3 billion USD, slightly outspending Germany (3 billion USD) and France (2.9 billion USD). The biggest donors, the UK and the U.S., have continued to up the ante year after year. In 2014, the US spent 9.3 billion USD on ODA and the UK spent 4.3 billion USD. Major multilateral donors have increased spending as well. In 2014, EU institutions funded numerous development, infrastructure and humanitarian programmes worth 6.7 billion USD, and the International Development Association (IDA)[6], a subsidiary of the World Bank Group, granted African governments loans worth 6.4 billion USD (AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2016).

6. The PRC is a member of the International Development Association (IDA)

Broadly speaking, firms that have entered African markets can be divided into state owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises. Most of those who accuse Chinese firms of colonialist tendencies focus on the former category (Dollar, 2016). By definition, SOEs are operated by the state and under direct supervision of the State Council (Lee, 2014). Nonetheless, despite the high degree of control governments have over firms, they are constrained by agreements (such as the Sustainable Development Goals), and regulations (such as the incorporation and training of local labour as well as technology transfers). Pressure from shareholders hinders publicly-listed companies in the West, prompting them to promote economic stability and invest in regional employment (Chintu and Williamson, 2013). Moreover, competition among SOEs, and between SOEs and privately-held corporations exists (Lin et al., 1998). According to Lee (2014), Chinese state capital is responsible for roughly half of Chinese FDI in Africa. The remaining half demonstrates that Chinese investment in Africa is not limited to public investment and government-to-government contracts. On the contrary, Gu (2009) argues that untapped market potential, local entrepreneurial spirit, and economic growth, create "pull factors" that attract small and medium sized Chinese firms. These pull factors operate in parallel to spill over demand generated as a result of SOE investment in the transportation and manufacturing sectors. In 2013, hundreds of SOEs competed against each other and 2,400 privately held corporations in the contest for market shares across the continent (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013; Lee, 2014). Among the businesses that have entered African markets, SOEs and private firms alike, have sought regional expertise and established joint ventures with African partners. In fact, Sino-African joint ventures have become the most common methods used to penetrate African markets (Taylor and Williams, 2004; Mawdsley, 2008).

China remains a marginal player in Africa despite the rate at which China's economic influence on the continent has continued to grow. On the micro level, both SOEs and private enterprises operate in direct competition—engaging in a rivalry created by economic pull factors and spillover effect.

> Claims that China is planning to colonise Africa are spurious and overblown. In particular, the hallmarks of colonialism –the ideology of a 'civilising mission', the accompanying territorial imperative and forging of exclusionary trade relations – are distinctly lacking in China's Africa policy (Alden, 2007: 27).

In light of this, the hypothesis of a newly emergent colonialism in Africa should be rejected. Representation of China as a colonising entity not only misinterprets existing data, but also ignores the role of private companies within the African economic context.

CONCLUSION

Using contemporary data from national treasuries, the AfDB, the OECD and the UNDP, this paper has empirically tested and discredited three influential interpretations of Sino-African relations. Primarily, while the U.S. invests the bulk of its FDI stock in the primary sector, China's focus in Africa is in the tertiary sector. Such is true for oil-rich countries, non-oil-rich resource intense countries, and resource-poor economies alike.

Secondly, accusations that China deliberately targets politically volatile countries to ease access to natural resources do not hold. Data has shown that (comparable to the general influx of funds to Africa) Chinese money is invested in good governance environments that generally apply the rule of law and ensure political stability. Instead, the brief Egyptian case study proves that Western governments do not abide by pledges to withdraw support from oppressive regimes. Thus the West does not possess sufficient grounds to blame China for unethical conduct.

Thirdly, this paper argues that China is not colonising Africa. Although there can be no doubt that the Chinese state is an influential stakeholder in African development via the presence of SOEs, a greater number of private enterprises and joint ventures cloud that influence. Ultimately, China remains a marginal player in Africa and accounts for a minimal share of FDI and ODA relative to other nations. Discussions of contemporary Sino-African relations are often rooted in three influential hypotheses, many of which have found popular support in the literature and none of which hold up to empirical scrutiny. Undoubtedly, the rise of China will continue to propagate many assumptions including those hypotheses outlined above. This essay has therefore sought to evaluate the nature of China's involvement in Africa and provide a nuanced analysis of Sino-African linkages in an oeuvre that press, academia and politics alike cannot afford to ignore.

REFERENCES

AfDB/OECD/UNDP (2016) African Economic Outlook 2016: Sustainable Cities and Structural Transformation, Paris: OECD Publishing.

Agrast, M., Botero, J., Martinez, J. and Ponce, A. eds. (2016) WJP Rule of Law Index® 2016, Washington, D.C.: The World Justice Project.

Alden, C. (2007) China in Africa, New York: Zed Books.

Alden, C., Large, D. and de Oliveira, R. S. (2008) China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, London: Hurst.

Ali, S. and N. Jafrani. (2012) 'China's Growing Role in Africa: Myths and Facts', International Economic Bulletin, February 2012, Carnegie Endowment for Peace.

Belhadj, I. and Sun, D. (2016) 'China in North Africa: A strategic partnership' in Zoubir, Y. H. and White, G., eds., North African Politics: Change and Continuity, Oxon: Routledge.

Bräutigam, D. (2009) The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bräutigam, D. and Zhang, H. (2013) 'Green Dreams: Myth and Reality in China's Agricultural Investment in Africa', Third World Quarterly, 34(9), 1676-1696.

Bräutigam, D. (2015, December) '5 Myths About Chinese Investment in Africa', Foreign Policy, available: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/04/5-myths-about-chinese-investment-in-africa/.

Carmody, P. R. and Owusu, F. Y. (2007) 'Competing hegemons? Chinese versus American geo-economic strategies in Africa', Political Geography, 26, 504-524.

Cumings, B. (2009) 'America's Perspective on China's Rise', in Hsiao, H.-H. M. and Lin, C., eds., Rise of China: Beijing's strategies and implications for the Asia-Pacific, New York: Routledge.

Chen, W., Dollar, D. and Tang, H. (2015) 'Why is China investing in Africa? Evidence from the firm level', John L. Thornton China Center Working Paper, Brookings Institution, available: https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-is-china-investing-in-africa-evidence-from-the-firm-level/.

Chintu, N. and Williamson, P. J. (2013) 'Chinese State-owned Enterprises in Africa: Myths and Realities', Ivey Business Journal Online, 1, available: http://search.proquest.com/docview/1369308533?accountid=9630.

Dollar, D. (2016) 'China's Engagement with Africa: From Natural Resources to Human Resources', Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Economy, E. C. and Levi, M. (2014) By All Means Necessary: How China's Resource Quest Is Changing the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

French, H. W. (2014, May) 'Into Africa: China's Wild Rush', The New York Times, available: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/opinion/into-africa-chinas-wild-rush.html?_r=1.

Gu, J. (2009) 'China's Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African Development', European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), 570-587.

Jauch, H. (2011) 'Chinese Investments in Africa: Twenty-First Century Colonialism?', New Labor Forum, 20(2), 48-55.

Jesprsen, C. (1996) American images of China, 1931-49, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kachiga, J. (2013) China in Africa: Articulating China's Africa Policy, Trenton, N.J.: African World Press.

Kristof, N. D. (1993) 'The Rise of China', Foreign Affairs, 72(5), 59-74.
Large, D. (2008a) 'Beyond 'Dragon in the Bush': The Study of China-Africa Relations', African Affairs, 107(426), 45-61.
Large, D. (2008b) 'China & the Contradictions of 'Non-Interference' in Sudan', Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), 93-106.
Lee, C. K. (2014) 'The Spectre of Global China', New Left Review, 89, 28-65.
Lin, J. Y., Cai, F. and Li, Z. (1998) 'Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-Owned Enterprise Reform', The American Economic Review, 88(2), 422-427.
Loxley, J. (1990) 'Structural Adjustment in Africa: Reflections on Ghana and Zambia', Review of African Political Economy, 47, 8-27.
Mailer, G. (2005, May) 'China in Africa: Economic Gains, Democratic Problems', available: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2005/05/09/china-in-africa-economic-gains-democratic-problems/.
Mawdsley, E. (2008) 'Fu Manchu versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark Continent? Representing China, Africa and the West in British broadsheet newspapers', Political Geography, 28, 509-529.
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. (2014) Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment, available: http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/date/201510/20151001130306.
Ministry of Finance of the Arab Republic of Egypt. (2016) The Financial Monthly, 11(12), Cairo: Ministry of Finance of the Arab Republic of Egypt.
Naidu, S. and Davies, M. (2006) 'China fuels its future with Africa's riches', South African Journal of International Affairs, 13(2), 69-83.
Naidu, S. and Mbazima, D. (2008) 'China-African relations: A new impulse in a changing continental landscape', Futures, 40, 748-761.
Patey, L. and Chun, Z. (2016, November) 'Improving the Sino-African Relationship' available: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2015-12-07/improving-sino-african-relationship.
Quinn, A. (2011, June) 'Clinton warns against 'new colonialism' in Africa', Reuters, available: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-clinton-africa-idUSTRE75A0RI20110611.
Raine, S. (2009) China's African Challenges, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Ribeiro, D. (2010) 'Disappearing forests, disappearing hope: Mozambique', in Harneit-Sievers, A., Marks, S. and Naidu, S. Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa, Oxford: Pambazuka Press.
Sanusi, L. (2013) 'Africa must get real about China', Financial Times, available: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/562692b0-898c-11e2-ad3f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3ZaBFDod4.
Shelton, G. (2008) 'South Africa and China: A strategic partnership?', in Alden, C., Large, D. and de Oliveira, R. S., eds., China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, London: Hurst.
So, A. Y. (2016) 'The Challenges of Global Rivalry: Resource Competition and Territorial Disputes', in So, A. Y. and Chu, Y.-W., eds., The Global Rise of China, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Song, W. (2015) 'Seeking new allies in Africa: China's policy towards Africa during the Cold War as reflected in the construction of the Tanzania–Zambia railway', Journal of Modern Chinese History, 9, 46-65.
Sy, A., Copley, A. and Rakotondrazaka, F. M. (2014) 'The U.S.-Africa Summit: A Focus on Foreign Direct Investment' The Brookings Institution. available: https://www.brook-

ings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/07/11/the-u-s-africa-leaders-summit-a-focus-on-foreign-direct-investment/#ftnte1.

Taylor, I. (2006) China and Africa: Engagement and compromise, Oxon: Routledge.

Taylor, I. and Williams, P. (2004) Africa in International Politics: External involvement on the continent, New York: Routledge.

Wood, G. (2004) 'Business and politics in a criminal state: the case of Equatorial Guinea', African Affairs, 103(413), 547-568.

Zafar, A. (2007) 'The Growing Relationship Between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment, and Aid Links', The World Bank Research Observer, 22, 103-130.